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DESCENT AND D1sTRIBUTION-INrnsTATE SuccEsSION FROM AN AnoPTED 
CHILD-WHo Aim His "BROTHERS AND S1sTERs"-Decedent had never married 
and was predeceased by his natural and adopted parents. The California statute 
provided that in such a case his property would go to his brothers and sisters.1 
Appellant, the natural daughter of decedent's adopted parents, contended that 
she was his sole heir under this statute, while respondent, decedent's natural 
brother, argued that the term ''brothers and sisters" meant blood relatives. The 
superior court applied the common meaning of the words brothers and sisters 
and held that appellant was not such a person. On appeal, held, reversed. 
Since the entire pattern of the California code indicates an intent to displace 
completely an adopted child's natural parents with his adopted family, the words 
''brothers and sisters" meant brothers and sisters known to decedent, i.e., his 
brothers and sisters by adoption. In re Calhoun's Estate, (Cal. App. 1954) 272 
P. (2d) 541. 
Inheritance from an adopted child is dependent upon existing statutes, for 
adoption was unknown at common law.2 If a state does not have a statute which 
changes the common law, an adopted child's estate on intestacy will normally 
descend to his wife, his issue, or other blood relatives. This is the rule in the 
great majority of states,3 but in an early California case the court read the 
adoption statute as completely terminating the parent-child relationship as to 
an intestate's natural father.4 This result accords with the policy of the Cali-
fornia legislature which subsequently passed a statute codifying this judicial 
l Cal. Prob. Code (1953) §225: "If decedent leaves neither issue nor spouse, the 
estate goes to his parents in equal shares, or if either is dead to the survivor, or if both are 
dead in equal shares to his brothers and sisters .•.. " 
2 Adoption was well established in Roman Law. Under Roman Law an adopted child 
became a member of his foster family for all purposes, including inheritance from him and 
to him. The Roman Law is relied on as a basis for some of the decisions in this area but 
this approach is severely criticized on the theory that the inheritance consequences of 
adoption were dependent on the structure of Roman Society and were not in fact carried 
forward into France, Germany or other Civil Law countries. See Hardgrove, "Futility of 
Resort to Roman Law for Interpretation of Statutes on Adoption," 9 MARQ. L. REv. 239 
(1925). 
3 See annotation, 42 A.L.R. 534 (1926) et seq. as supplemented by 170 A.L.R. 742 
(1947). 
4 In re Jobson's Estate, 164 Cal. 312, 128 P. 938 (1912). 
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determination. 5 The California statutes relating to adopted children have been 
amended several more times and each modification tended to integrate more 
completely the adopted child into his foster family.6 Thus the court was apply-
ing sound principles of judicial construction in reading this section of its statute.1 
In interpreting this California statute the court did not have available an inter-
mediate approach. Under the statutes of other states it is either required, or is 
possible, for the court to look to the source of the property, and to permit the 
inheritance to go accordingly. This approach is at least analogous to the common 
law principle which favors keeping property received by descent in blood lines, 8 
and is superior to permitting all of an adopted child's property to go to his natural 
heirs or next of kin. The principle was once widely used and is still the law 
of a considerable number of jurisdictions.9 In still other states, the adoption 
statutes emphasize the establishment of a family relationship between the 
adopted child and his foster family without mentioning inheritance rights, 10 and 
here many socially undesirable results are reached by the courts.11 The modem 
trend of society, as evidenced by recent legislative enactments, seems clearly in 
the direction of complete replacement of the natural family by the adopted one.12 
One of the factors giving impetus to this trend seems to be the change in the 
number and type of adoptions. In recent years there has been an amazing 
liCal. Prob. Code (1953) §257: " ••• An adopted child does not succeed to the 
estate of a natural parent when the relationship between them has been severed by the 
adoption, nor does such natural parent succeed to the estate of such adopted child." 
6 See the following sections of the California Statutes: Civil Code (1949) §§228 and 
229; Health and Safety Code (1951) §§10252, 10253, and 10253.5; Probate Code (1953) 
§§223 and 257. The most striking of these statutes is Probate Code §257, which provides 
that "An adopted child succeeds to the estate of the one who adopted him, the same as a 
natural child; and the person adopting succeeds to the estate of an adopted child, the same 
as a natural parent . • . ." 
1 Many courts feel that these statutes are in derogation of the common law and are 
to be strictly construed, regardless of other expressions of legislative policy in the state 
statutes. See Upson v. Noble, 35 Ohio St. 655 at 658 (1880); Grimes v. Grimes, 207 
N.C. 778 at 780, 178 S.E. 573 (1935); 42 A.L.R. 534 et seq. (1926). 
s This policy was present in the fifth canon of the English Canons of Descent as 
announced by Blackstone in 2 BLACKST. CoMM., Wendell ed., c. 14. As to the present 
effect of this theory, see ATKINSON, WILLS, 2d ed., §21 (1953). 
9 See Kuhlmann, "Intestate Succession By and From the Adopted Child," 28 WASH. 
UNIV. L.Q. 221 at 231 (1943). See also 1 W:ssT. R:ss. L. R:sv. 133, n. 22 (1949) for 
a list of the states which follow this view. 
10 See Idaho Code (1948) §16-1508; Miss. Code Ann. (1942) tit. IO, §1269; N.D. 
Rev. Code (1943) tit. 14, §1113; Utah Code Ann. (1953) tit. 78, §30-10. 
11 For a statement of social policy see 1 W:ssT. R:ss. L. R:sv. 133 at 141 (1949). Cf. 
annotations in note 3 supra. 
12 This general trend can be seen by examining the different alignments of the sev-
eral states in each of the following articles: 22 IowA L. R:sv. 145 (1936), 28 WAsH. 
Umv. L.Q. 221 (1943), and 1 W:ssT. R:ss. L. R:sv. 133 (1949). Since 1949 several 
other states have changed their statutes relating to inheritance from adopted children and, 
in each case, the change favors the adoptive family over the natural family. See Del. Code 
Ann (1953) tit. 13, §920; ill. Rev. Stat. (1953) c. 3, §165; N.M. Stat. Ann. (1953) c. 
22, §22-2-19; Ohio Rev. Code (Baldwin, 1953) §3107.13; S.C. Stat. L. (1954) No. 698; 
Tenn. Code Ann. (Williams, 1934) §9572.37; Va. Code (1950) tit. 63, §358, as amended 
by 1954 Laws, c. 489. 
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expansion in the number of adoptions,18 and with this growth has come the 
establishment of professional adoption agencies, both public and private.u 
While no uniform rules or regulations exist, the majority of these agencies 
attempt to place very young children with reliable families and to keep all 
records of the adoption confidential.16 In these cases the inheritance problems 
are quite acute for several reasons. First, the child and his adopted family will 
have little or no knowledge about the child's natural family,16 and second, the 
adopted parents will, in the great majority of cases, either have furnished the 
adopted child with a large portion of his estate, as occurred in the principal case, 
or will have provided him with the education and training which enabled him 
to accumulate an estate. Viewed in this light, it would seem that the court in 
the principal case was merely filling a gap in the statutes in a manner which is 
entirely consistent with the general approach of the California legislature in 
dealing with the existing social problems presented by inheritance from an 
adopted child. 
Jack G. Armstrong 
18A survey by U.S. Children's Bureau indicates that the number of children for whom 
adoption proceedings were filed in 1944 was three times as great as the number filed in 
1934, and available information indicates that this trend has continued. See LEAVY, LA.w 
OP A»oPTION SIMPI.IFDID (1948). 
14 See U.S. Cmr.»REN's BtmEAu, EssENTIAI.S OP A»oPTION LA.w Am> Ps.oCJmmm 
5-10 (1949). 
15 Id. at 9. See specifically Cal. Health and Safety Code (1951) §§10252, 10253, and 
10253.5. These sections provide for the issuing of a corrected birth certificate which makes 
no mention of the adoption, and also for the filing and sealing of all papers relating to the 
adoption. . 
10 See U.S. CHILDREN'S BUREAU, EssENTIAI.s oP AnoPTioN I.Aw AND Ps.oCEDURE 
8-9 (1949). The court in the principal case also took judicial notice of this increasing 
practice. 
